2024 -- S 2385 | |
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LC004601 | |
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND | |
IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY | |
JANUARY SESSION, A.D. 2024 | |
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A N A C T | |
RELATING TO INSURANCE -- THIRD-PARTY HEALTH INSURANCE | |
ADMINISTRATORS -- PRESCRIPTION DRUG COST CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY | |
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Introduced By: Senators Ujifusa, Miller, Murray, Mack, DiMario, Lawson, Valverde, | |
Date Introduced: February 12, 2024 | |
Referred To: Senate Health & Human Services | |
It is enacted by the General Assembly as follows: | |
1 | SECTION 1. The general assembly hereby finds and declares as follows: |
2 | (1) About forty percent (40%) of Americans struggle to afford their regular prescription |
3 | medicines, with one-third (1/3) skipping doses because of cost. |
4 | (2) Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) began in the 1970s as small independent |
5 | middlemen between insurers and pharmacies, taking a set fee for processing claims, but today, have |
6 | become part of large, vertically integrated conglomerates whose revenues exceed those of top |
7 | pharmaceutical manufacturers making United Health Group, CVS and Cigna rank fifth, sixth and |
8 | fifteenth, respectively, on the Fortune 500 list ranking largest corporations by revenues. |
9 | (3) PBMs drive revenues for their parent companies, e.g., CVS's PBM business made fifty- |
10 | two percent (52%) of CVS's revenue in 2022 ($169.2 billion) - up 10% from $153 billion in 2021. |
11 | (4) Three (3) PBMs control about eighty percent (80%) of the market: |
12 | (i) CVS Caremark – thirty-three percent (33%) market share – parent company: CVS |
13 | (Aetna); |
14 | (ii) Express Scripts – twenty-four percent (24%) market share – parent company: Cigna; |
15 | (iii) OptumRx – twenty-two percent (22%) market share – parent company: UnitedHealth. |
16 | (5) While middlemen PBMs are enjoying record profits, patients struggle to find health |
17 | care providers, and health care providers in Rhode Island have been financially struggling, e.g., |
18 | Memorial Hospital in Pawtucket closed, the state's largest Visiting Nurses Association closed, |
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1 | multiple nursing homes have closed; Roger Williams Medical Center and Our Lady of Fatima |
2 | hospitals were sold to a for-profit, out-of-state corporation and may be about to be sold again. |
3 | (6) A major problem caused by PBMs is that they charge "insurance sponsors" like |
4 | Medicaid, more than what they reimburse pharmacies and pocket the difference (that is, keep "the |
5 | spread"), e.g., annually PBMs kept spread pricing revenues of $123.5 million in Kentucky, $29 |
6 | million in Virginia; and $72 million in Maryland. |
7 | (7) PBMs have been found to cause numerous additional problems including: |
8 | (i) Placing drugs on formularies to increase their legal kickbacks ("rebates") from |
9 | manufacturers instead of choosing the most effective or affordable drugs for consumers. |
10 | (ii) Causing drug manufacturers to cover PBM rebates by raising list prices for drugs – |
11 | adding an estimated thirty cents ($0.30) per dollar to the price consumers pay for prescriptions. |
12 | (iii) Causing independent pharmacies to go out of business by favoring PBM-affiliated |
13 | retail, mail order and specialty pharmacies, such as by steering customers to their affiliates or |
14 | paying less to non-affiliated pharmacies for the same drugs (e.g., in Florida, PBM-affiliated |
15 | pharmacies got 18 to 109 times more profit than the typical community pharmacy for brand name |
16 | drugs); |
17 | (8) PBMs make government oversight virtually impossible by hiding profits in multiple |
18 | ways, including by designating rebates and discounts as confidential, renaming them as "fees" or |
19 | "savings" and creating "Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs)" that add another layer of |
20 | middlemen to an already opaque and complex system; |
21 | (9) PBMs implement "utilization management" policies that can adversely affect clinical |
22 | outcomes by making providers spend excessive time on administrative tasks, and delaying and |
23 | discouraging patient care, including: |
24 | (i) "Prior authorizations," which require patients to get third-party approval prior to getting |
25 | medicines prescribed by their health care provider; |
26 | (ii) "Step therapy," also known as "fail-first," "sequencing," and "tiering," which requires |
27 | patients to start with lower-priced medications before being approved for originally prescribed |
28 | medications; and |
29 | (iii) "Non-medical drug switching" which forces patients off their current therapies |
30 | primarily to save insurers money, including by increasing out-of-pocket costs, moving treatments |
31 | to higher cost tiers, or terminating coverage of a particular drug. |
32 | (10) PBMs can profit from a federal program ("Section 340B") meant to help low-income |
33 | patients by engaging in "discriminatory reimbursement," e.g., offering 340B entities lower |
34 | reimbursement rates than those offered to non-340B entities. |
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1 | (11) Recently, more than one-half of all state legislation aimed at controlling prescription |
2 | drug prices have focused on PBMs, and multiple states besides Rhode Island are aggressively |
3 | taking actions: |
4 | (i) Ohio has gone to a single state PBM after its state auditor found that of the $2.5 billion |
5 | spent annually through PBMs on Medicaid prescription drugs, PBMs pocketed $224.8 million |
6 | through spread alone during a one-year period; and; |
7 | (ii) West Virginia passed a law requiring PBMs to share the savings they negotiate on |
8 | medicines directly with West Virginia patients; and saved customers and taxpayers about $54 |
9 | million in the first year (a little over $6 per individual prescription). |
10 | (12) A recent United States supreme court case, Rutledge v. PCMA, 141 S.Ct. 474 (2020), |
11 | supports states taking actions to regulate PBMs. |
12 | (13) Rhode Island policymakers have not properly analyzed much less controlled PBMs |
13 | and their effects on the cost of prescription drugs. |
14 | (14) Rhode Island Medicaid managed care organization (MCO) contracts which had an |
15 | estimated cost to all taxpayers of over one billion seven hundred million dollars ($1,700,000,000) |
16 | per year have not previously included adequate PBM oversight and controls; |
17 | (15) The state must prevent PBM actions that obfuscate the complex drug supply chain and |
18 | cause prescription drug costs to rise without demonstrated benefits to Rhode Islanders. |
19 | SECTION 2. Legislative intent. |
20 | The intent of this legislation is to protect patients, healthcare providers, and taxpayers from |
21 | high prescription drug costs by requiring greater pharmacy benefit manager transparency and |
22 | accountability. |
23 | SECTION 3. Section 27-20.7-12 of the General Laws in Chapter 27-20.7 entitled "Third- |
24 | Party Health Insurance Administrators" is hereby amended to read as follows: |
25 | 27-20.7-12. Certificate of authority required. |
26 | (a) No person shall act as, or offer to act as, or hold himself or herself out to be an |
27 | administrator in this state without a valid certificate of authority as an administrator issued by the |
28 | commissioner. |
29 | (b) Applicants to be an administrator shall make an application to the commissioner upon |
30 | a form to be furnished by the commissioner. The application shall include or be accompanied by |
31 | the following information and documents: |
32 | (1) All basic organizational documents of the administrator, including any articles of |
33 | incorporation, articles of association, partnership agreement, trade name certificate, trust |
34 | agreement, shareholder agreement, and other applicable documents and all amendments to those |
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1 | documents; |
2 | (2) The bylaws, rules, regulations, or similar documents regulating the internal affairs of |
3 | the administrator; |
4 | (3) The names, addresses, official positions, and professional qualifications of the |
5 | individuals who are responsible for the conduct of affairs of the administrator; including all |
6 | members of the board of directors, board of trustees, executive committee, or other governing board |
7 | or committee; the principal officers in the case of a corporation or the partners or members in the |
8 | case of a partnership or association; shareholders holding directly or indirectly ten percent (10%) |
9 | or more of the voting securities of the administrator; and any other person who exercises control or |
10 | influence over the affairs of the administrator; |
11 | (4) Annual financial statements or reports for the two (2) most recent years which prove |
12 | that the applicant is solvent and any information that the commissioner may require in order to |
13 | review the current financial condition of the applicant; |
14 | (5) A statement describing the business plan including information on staffing levels and |
15 | activities proposed in this state and nationwide. The plan must provide details setting forth the |
16 | administrator’s capability for providing a sufficient number of experienced and qualified personnel |
17 | in the areas of claims processing, recordkeeping and underwriting; |
18 | (6) If the applicant will be managing the solicitation of new or renewal business, proof that |
19 | it employs or has contracted with an agent licensed by this state for solicitation and taking of |
20 | applications. An applicant that intends to directly solicit insurance contracts or to act as an insurance |
21 | producer must provide proof that it has a license as an insurance producer in this state; and |
22 | (7) Information required by the office of health insurance commissioner (OHIC) pursuant |
23 | to § 27-29.1-7; and |
24 | (8) Any other pertinent information that may be required by the commissioner. |
25 | (c) The applicant shall make available, for inspection by the commissioner, copies of all |
26 | contracts with insurers or other persons utilizing the services of the administrator. |
27 | (d) The commissioner may refuse to issue a certificate of authority if the commissioner |
28 | determines that the administrator, or any individual responsible for the conduct of affairs of the |
29 | administrator as defined in subsection (b)(3) of this section, is not competent, trustworthy, |
30 | financially responsible or of good personal and business reputation, or has had an insurance or an |
31 | administrator license denied or revoked for cause by any state. |
32 | (e) A certificate of authority issued under this section shall remain valid, unless |
33 | surrendered, suspended, or revoked by the commissioner, for so long as the administrator continues |
34 | in business in this state and remains in compliance with this chapter. |
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1 | (f) An administrator is not required to hold a certificate of authority as an administrator in |
2 | this state if all of the following conditions are met: |
3 | (1) The administrator has its principal place of business in another state; |
4 | (2) The administrator is not soliciting business as an administrator in this state; |
5 | (3) In the case of any group policy or plan of insurance serviced by the administrator, the |
6 | lesser of five percent (5%) or one hundred (100) certificate holders reside in this state. |
7 | (g) A person is not required to hold a certificate of authority as an administrator in this state |
8 | if the person exclusively provides services to one or more bona fide employee benefit plans each |
9 | of which is established by an employer or an employee organization, or both, and for which the |
10 | insurance laws of this state are preempted pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security |
11 | Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. These persons shall register with the commissioner annually, |
12 | verifying their status as described in this section. |
13 | (h) An administrator shall immediately notify the commissioner of any material change in |
14 | its ownership, control, or other fact or circumstance affecting its qualification for a certificate of |
15 | authority in this state. |
16 | (i) No bonding shall be required by the commissioner of any administrator whose business |
17 | is restricted solely to benefit plans that are either fully insured by an authorized insurer or that are |
18 | bona fide employee benefit plans established by an employer or any employee organization, or |
19 | both, for which the insurance laws of this state are preempted pursuant to the Employee Retirement |
20 | Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. |
21 | SECTION 4. Section 27-29.1-7 of the General Laws in Chapter 27-29.1 entitled "Pharmacy |
22 | Freedom of Choice — Fair Competition and Practices" is hereby amended to read as follows: |
23 | 27-29.1-7. Regulation of pharmacy benefits managers. |
24 | (a) Pharmacy benefits managers shall be included within the definition of third-party |
25 | administrator under chapter 20.7 of this title and shall be regulated as such. The annual report filed |
26 | by third-party administrators with the department of business regulation shall include: contractual |
27 | language that provides a complete description of the financial arrangements between the third-party |
28 | administrator and each of the insurers covering benefit contracts delivered in Rhode Island; and if |
29 | the third-party administrator is owned by or affiliated with another entity or entities, it shall include |
30 | an organization chart and brief description that shows the relationships among all affiliates within |
31 | a holding company or otherwise affiliated. The reporting shall be in a format required by the |
32 | director and filed with the department as a public record as defined and regulated under chapter 2 |
33 | of title 38. |
34 | (b) Pharmacy benefit managers shall: |
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1 | (1) Cease activities that result in spread pricing; |
2 | (2) Implement pharmacy pass-through pricing; |
3 | (3) Not engage in discriminatory treatment of non-affiliated pharmacies and pharmacists; |
4 | (4) Cease utilization management, including prior authorization, step therapy and non- |
5 | medical drug switching, that delays or discourages medically necessary care; |
6 | (5) Implement one hundred percent (100%) pass-through of manufacturer-derived |
7 | revenues or discounts, including rebates and coupons, that shall be demonstrated to directly lower |
8 | prescription drug prices for consumers; |
9 | (6) Prioritize benefits to consumers and not pharmacy benefit managers or affiliated |
10 | company revenues in determining placement of drugs on formularies; |
11 | (7) Cease profiting from a federal program ("Section 340B") meant to help low-income |
12 | patients by engaging in discriminatory reimbursement, e.g., offering 340B entities lower |
13 | reimbursement rates than those offered to non-340B entities; |
14 | (8) Provide information and documents requested by the office of health insurance |
15 | commissioner that relate to enforcement of this section, including those related to: |
16 | (i) Rebates, discounts or other compensation and benefits pharmacy benefit managers |
17 | receive from drug manufacturers; |
18 | (ii) Payments from insurers to pharmacy benefit managers for prescription drugs and |
19 | payments from pharmacy benefit managers on behalf of insurers to pharmacies for those drugs; |
20 | (iii) Payments to pharmacy benefit managers from pharmacies, including for |
21 | administrative fees and claw backs; |
22 | (iv) Differences between what pharmacy benefit managers reimburse and charge affiliated |
23 | and non-affiliated pharmacies for specific prescription drugs; and |
24 | (v) Reimbursement constructs utilized by the pharmacy benefit managers at any point in |
25 | time for each prescription, including applicable lists for wholesale acquisition cost (WAC), |
26 | maximum allowable cost (MAC), and average wholesale price (AWP). |
27 | (c) The office of health insurance commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations, |
28 | and hire independent contractors familiar with pharmacy benefit managers finances to allow |
29 | implementation and enforcement of the terms of this section. The legislature shall approve funding |
30 | for the office of health insurance commissioner staff and contractors necessary to ensure the |
31 | requirements of this section are met and can be properly enforced. |
32 | (d) The office of health insurance commissioner may enforce the provisions of this section |
33 | by imposing civil fines up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation, or by taking any other |
34 | enforcement actions not prohibited by law. Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the attorney |
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1 | general from also taking actions against PBMs to enforce any laws, including the provisions set |
2 | forth in this chapter. |
3 | (e) Should any provision of this section be found unconstitutional, preempted, or otherwise |
4 | invalid, that provision shall be severed and such decision shall not affect the validity of the other |
5 | parts of this section. |
6 | SECTION 5. This act shall take effect upon passage. |
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LC004601 | |
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EXPLANATION | |
BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL | |
OF | |
A N A C T | |
RELATING TO INSURANCE -- THIRD-PARTY HEALTH INSURANCE | |
ADMINISTRATORS -- PRESCRIPTION DRUG COST CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY | |
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1 | This act would protect patients, healthcare providers, and taxpayers from high prescription |
2 | drug costs by requiring greater pharmacy benefit manager transparency and accountability. It gives |
3 | the office of health insurance commissioner (OHIC) authority to promulgate regulations and |
4 | oversee implementation. |
5 | This act would take effect upon passage. |
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LC004601 | |
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