2022 -- H 7214

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LC004131

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     STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

JANUARY SESSION, A.D. 2022

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A N   A C T

RELATING TO ELECTIONS -- CONDUCT OF ELECTION AND VOTING EQUIPMENT

AND SUPPLIES

     

     Introduced By: Representatives Place, Chippendale, Filippi, and Price

     Date Introduced: January 26, 2022

     Referred To: House State Government & Elections

     It is enacted by the General Assembly as follows:

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     SECTION 1. Section 17-19-37.4 of the General Laws in Chapter 17-19 entitled "Conduct

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of Election and Voting Equipment, and Supplies" is hereby amended to read as follows:

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     17-19-37.4. Post-election audits.

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     (a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that auditing of election

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results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and public confidence in the election

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results. Further, risk-limiting audits provide a more effective manner of conducting audits than

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traditional audit methods in that risk-limiting audit methods typically require only limited resources

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for election contests with wide margins of victory while investing greater resources in close

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contests.

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     (b) Commencing in 2018, the board, in conjunction with local boards, is authorized to

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conduct risk-limiting audits after all statewide primary, general, and special elections in accordance

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with the requirements of this section. Commencing in 2020, the state board, in conjunction with

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local boards, must conduct risk-limiting audits after the presidential preference primary and general

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elections in accordance with the requirements in this section.

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     (c) The audit program shall be conducted as follows:

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     (1) The state board shall determine what local, statewide, and federal contests are subject

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to a risk-limiting audit;

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     (2) The state board shall provide notice pursuant to chapter 46 of title 42 of the time and

 

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place of the random selection of the audit units to be manually tallied and of the times and places

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of the audits;

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     (3) The state board shall make available to the public a report of the vote-tabulating device

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results for the contest, including the results for each audit unit in the contest, prior to the random

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selection of audit units to be manually tallied and prior to the commencement of the audit;

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     (4) The state board, in conjunction with the local boards, shall conduct the audit upon

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tabulation of the unofficial final results as provided in §§ 17-19-36 and 17-19-37; and

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     (5) The state board, in conjunction with the local boards, shall conduct the audit in public

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view by manually interpreting the ballots according to rules established by the state board in

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accordance with chapter 35 of title 42.

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     (d) If a risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of the ballots cast using

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the voting system, the vote counts according to that manual tally shall replace the vote counts

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reported pursuant to §§ 17-19-36 and 17-19-37 for the purpose of determining the official contest

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results pursuant to §§ 17-22-5.2 and 17-22-6.

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     (e) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

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     (1) "Audit unit" means a precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot. A precinct, a set of

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ballots, or a single ballot may be used as an audit unit for purposes of this section only if all of the

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following conditions are satisfied:

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     (i) The relevant vote-tabulating device is able to produce a report of the votes cast in the

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precinct, set of ballots, or single ballot; and

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     (ii) Each ballot is assigned to not more than one audit unit.

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     (2) "Contest" means an election for an office or for a measure.

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     (3) "Risk-limiting audit" means a manual tally employing a statistical method that ensures

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a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual

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tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the vote-tabulating

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system for the audited contest. A risk-limiting audit shall begin with a hand tally of the votes in one

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or more audit units and shall continue to hand tally votes in additional audit units until there is

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strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct. In the event that counting additional

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audit units does not provide strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct, the

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audit shall continue until there has been a full manual tally to determine the correct electoral

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outcome of the audited contest.

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     (4) "Unofficial final results" means election results tabulated pursuant to §§ 17-19-36 and

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17-19-37.

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     (f) The results of any audits conducted under this section shall be published on the website

 

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of the state board within forty-eight (48) hours of being accepted by the state board. If the audit

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involved a manual tally of one or more entire precincts, then the names and numbers of all precincts

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audited and a comparison of the vote tabulator results with the hand counts for each precinct shall

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be published with the audit results on the website.

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     (g) Any audit required under this section shall not commence for any election subject to a

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recount pursuant to §§ 17-19-37.1, 17-19-37.2, and 17-19-37.3 until the conclusion of said recount.

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     (h) In addition to the post-election audit procedures previously created in this section, the

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following audit shall be performed:

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     (1) Before the election results are certified, pursuant to this chapter, the board of elections

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shall conduct a post-election risk-limiting audit of the mail ballot voter signature verification

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accuracy of the return mail ballot envelopes received for the local, statewide and federal contests,

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selected by the board, utilizing the ballot audit selection process created by § 17-19-37.4.

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     (2) If the risk-limiting audit of the signatures on the mail ballot envelopes cast in the audited

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contest reveals that the number of signatures on the mail ballot envelopes that should not have been

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verified, exceeds the margin of victory in the selected contest, then a new special election shall be

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held for such contest, before its election results are certified.

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     (h)(i) The state board shall promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures in accordance

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with chapter 35 of title 42 necessary to implement this section.

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     SECTION 2. This act shall take effect upon passage.

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EXPLANATION

BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

OF

A N   A C T

RELATING TO ELECTIONS -- CONDUCT OF ELECTION AND VOTING EQUIPMENT

AND SUPPLIES

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     This act would create a new additional post-election risk-limiting audit of voted mail

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ballots, focusing on voter signature verification.

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     This act would take effect upon passage.

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